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currently limited understanding of how traditional advertising and product placement affect 
television audiences. We estimate a random coefficients logit model of viewing demand for 
television programs, wherein time given to advertising and product placement plays a role akin 
to the “price” of consuming a program. Our data include audience, advertising, and program 
characteristics from more than 10,000 network-hours of prime-time broadcast television from 
2004 to 2007. We find that the median effect of a 10% rise in advertising time is a 15% reduction 
in audience size. We find evidence that creative strategy and product category are important 
determinants of viewer response to advertising. When we control for program episode quality, 
we find that product placement time decreases viewer utility. In sum, our results imply that 
networks should give price discounts to those advertisers whose ads are most likely to retain 
viewers’ interest throughout the commercial break. 
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 Television viewing is the dominant leisure activity in America. In a telephone survey 
Americans reported watching 2.6 hours of television per day, more than half of total leisure 
time.1 Other measures suggest time spent viewing is higher. Nielsen Media Research estimates 
the average adult watched 4.9 hours of television per day in 2007.2 
 Television is still the dominant medium for audio/visual advertising. In 2007 the 
television industry earned $67.8 billion in advertising revenues. Those revenues grew 35% from 
2001 to 2007—more than twice as fast as inflation—and accounted for 48% of cumulative 
advertising expenditures. While some other advertising media (e.g., internet display advertising) 
grew at higher percentage rates due to smaller revenue bases, television advertising grew more 
than any other medium from 2001 to 2007.3 
 Traditionally, broadcast television networks have provided viewers with nominally free 
programs in exchange for their attention and sold that attention to advertisers based on program 
audience measurements. The structure of the industry suggests that most viewers have a relative 
preference for programs or non-television activities over watching advertising. If this were not 
the case, networks would presumably refrain from producing such costly programming.  
 The traditional television business model has been weakened by two recent trends. First, 
viewers are acquiring digital video recorders (DVRs), which enable them to easily fast-forward 
past advertisements in recorded and “near-live” programming. The DVR was introduced in 1999, 
and 24.4% of American households owned one as of mid-2008.2 Figure 1 shows that broadcast 
networks have responded to DVR growth in part by increasing product placements (“unskippable 
advertising”) in their shows by about 40% in the three years to March 2008. Second, 
improvements in audience tracking technologies have changed business practices. Digital cable 
boxes and DVRs allow continuous tracking of channel tuning, leading advertisers to demand 
increasingly granular data about how many viewers watched a particular ad, rather than the 
program during which the ad appeared. Since September 2007, ad deals have been based on 
                                                 
1 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, “American Time Use Survey,” 2006. 
2 Source: Data reported online at www.tvb.org. Accessed November 2008. 
3 Source: TNS Media Intelligence custom report. In 2007 advertisers spent $28.0 billion on magazines, $26.2 billion 
on newspapers, $11.4 billion on internet display advertising, $3.9 billion on outdoor advertising, and $3.4 billion on 
radio. 
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programs’ average commercial minute rating,4 rather than program rating. Many analysts expect 
more granular advertisement ratings to be available in the future. 
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Growth of Product Placements, 4/2005-5/2008
ln(Prime-Time Seconds of Product Placements on Top 7 Broadcast Networks)  
 
 Thus viewers are better able to avoid advertisements than ever before. And networks are 
more likely to be financially penalized for advertisement avoidance than ever before. Our 
purpose in this paper, then, is to understand the effects of advertising and product placements on 
television audiences.  
This understanding is important in practice for several reasons. First, it can inform 
networks’ sales strategy, influencing which advertisers they seek to sell commercial time to. 
Second, it can influence networks’ pricing. It may be optimal to raise ad prices for advertisers 
whose ads cause larger audience losses than average, or offer discounts to advertisers whose ads 
cause smaller audience losses. Third, viewer welfare is directly enhanced if networks can reduce 
viewer disutility from advertising. And if this reduction raises networks’ advertising revenues, 
there may be an indirect effect on viewer welfare in the form of increased program investments. 
                                                 
4 A commercial minute is any minute (e.g., 8:12:00 p.m.-8:12:59 p.m.) in which a part of a commercial is aired. The 
standard, called “C3,” also includes DVR viewing up to 3 days after the program air date.  
6 We use the term “product placement” to refer to the inclusion of brands or products within television programs, 
also known as called “branded entertainment,” “plugs,” or “tie-ins.” We refer to blocks of time sold to advertisers as 
“traditional advertising” or simply “advertising.” We use the terms “program” and “show” interchangeably. An “ad 
creative” is a set of visual and audio stimuli encoded in a video file. 
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We estimate a random coefficients logit model of television viewing demand using data 
from the television seasons ending in 2005, 2006, and 2007. In this model, the amount of time 
given to advertising and product placement is the “price” the viewer must pay to consume a 
program. We find that a 10% increase in advertising time causes a median audience loss of about 
15%. We find that the simple effect of product placement time on television audiences is 
positive, but when we control for program episode quality, we find that product placement time 
reduces audience sizes. Audience reaction to individual advertisements seems to be driven by 
advertising content and product category.  
In section 1 we discuss salient features of the industry and the recent academic literature. 
We present our model of television viewing behavior in section 2 and discuss the data we use to 
estimate the model in section 3. We discuss the estimation strategy in section 4. We present the 
results in section 5 and discuss their implications and limitations in section 6. We confine most 
technical discussions (data issues, estimation, identification, etc.) to the technical appendix. 
 
1. Industry Background and Relevant Literature 
This paper is primarily related to three disparate strands of literature: advertisement avoidance, 
television viewing demand, and product placement.6 
 Several papers document the strategies television viewers use to avoid commercials. 
Danaher (1995) investigated Nielsen Peoplemeter7 data in New Zealand and found that audience 
sizes fell by a net 5% during ad breaks, due to a 10% audience loss to switching and a 5% 
audience gain from viewers leaving other channels. However, the context of the study was a 
three-channel environment in which simultaneous ad breaks were commonplace. Using 
Peoplemeter data from the Netherlands, Van Meurs (1998) found that channel switching 
decreased audience size during advertising breaks by a net 21.5%. These finding are buttressed 
by the large literature on advertising wear-in and wear-out. For example, Siddarth and 
Chattopadhyay (1998) found the probability that a household switches channels during a 
particular ad is “J-shaped” with a minimum at 14 exposures. 
 Other researchers have measured advertisement avoidance in the lab. Woltman Elpers, et 
al. (2003) found that subjects stopped watching 59.6% and 76.1% of all commercials in two 
                                                 
7The peoplemeter is a box connected to television set. Each family member in a househould is assigned a viewing 
button on the peoplemeter that identifies the member’s demographics.  
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experiments. They found that commercial watching increases with entertainment content and 
decreases with information content. Teixeira, Wedel, and Pieters (2008) estimated the effects of 
commercial characteristics on commercial avoidance. Their findings include an inverted “U”-
shaped relationship between advertisement attention and visual complexity, and a positive effect 
of brand presence and duration on viewer switching. They used the estimates to calculate what 
pattern of brand appearances minimizes commercial avoidance, finding that, holding on-screen 
brand time constant, brand pulsing can reduce commercial avoidance substantially.  
 Advertising avoidance notwithstanding, until September 2007 advertising sales contracts 
were based on average program ratings, not advertisement ratings. Thus, the forms of advertising 
avoidance that most directly impacted network revenues were switching channels or turning off 
the television, as these are the two strategies most likely to decrease a program rating.  
 Quite separate from advertisement avoidance, there is a large literature on predicting 
viewer demand for television programs. Rust and Alpert (1984) were the first to use a discrete 
choice model to explain viewing behavior demonstrating that, contrary to previous findings, 
programs are important predictors of network audiences. More recently, Shachar and Emerson 
(2000) introduced cast demographic variables in viewing demand estimation and showed that 
viewers are more likely to watch programs that feature people who are demographically similar 
to themselves. Goettler and Shachar (2001) estimated a multidimensional ideal point demand 
system to calibrate a model of optimal program scheduling, finding that networks’ adherence to 
scheduling heuristics (e.g. no situation comedies after 10 p.m.) was suboptimal. Anand and 
Shachar (2005) used data on viewers’ exposure to television program “tune-ins” and subsequent 
viewing choices to identify tune-in effectiveness. They found that tune-ins are informative in 
nature: they make viewers more likely to watch programs that confer high subjective utility, and 
more likely to avoid programs that confer low subjective utility. Yang, Narayan, and Assael 
(2006) estimate a model in which husbands and wives have joint latent viewing preferences, 
finding that wives’ viewing behavior depends more strongly on husbands’ viewing status than 
vice versa.  
 A few studies have measured audience sensitivity to advertising levels, controlling for 
characteristics of media content. Wilbur (2008b) estimated indirect network effects on both sides 
of the television industry, finding that a highly-rated broadcast network loses about 25% of its 
median audience in response to a unilateral 10% increase in advertising time. Kaiser and Wright 
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(2006) estimated a two-sided equilibrium model of viewers and advertisers of women’s 
magazines, finding that ads increased reader utility from magazines. Depken and Wilson (2004) 
estimated magazine-specific audience responses to advertising and found substantial 
heterogeneity in preferences across magazines. The process by which advertising leads to 
increased or decreased viewership/readership has not been fully explored, but could depend on 
consumer demographics and heterogeneity, media content and usage, and advertising content, 
targeting, and intrusiveness.  . Goeree (2008) found that advertising exposure and impact varies 
across demographic groups and advertising media, so it seems reasonable to expect that 
advertising avoidance also varies across consumer demographics and media. 
 We also study audience responses to product placement. The first on-screen product 
placement occurred shortly after the invention of the movie, when in 1896 the Lumiere brothers 
filmed women washing clothes with Lever Brothers’ Sunlight Soap placed in a prominent 
position. Lever Brothers provided Swiss film distribution in exchange for the favorable 
treatment. A commonly cited successful placement was the appearance of Reese’s Pieces in the 
film E.T. the Extraterrestrial, to which Hershey’s attributed a 65% rise in sales. Less commonly 
discussed is the placement of Coors Lite in the same film, to which no sales rise was attributed 
(Newell, Salmon and Chang 2006). 
 Balasubramanian, Karrh, and Parwardhan (2006) review the behavioral literature on 
product placement, attributing the many discrepancies among published findings to brand, 
consumer, and placement heterogeneity, and the difficulty of reproducing product placement 
stimuli in laboratory settings. An interesting framework is proposed by Russell (2002). She finds 
that placements have differential effects on consumers’ memory and brand attitudes. Obtrusive 
placements are most likely to be remembered, but they positively influence consumers’ attitude 
toward the brand only when they are congruent with the plot, and can harm brand attitudes when 
they are incongruent with the plot. These findings seem to refute Ephron’s (2003) conjecture 
about product placement: “If you notice, it’s bad. But if you don’t, it’s worthless.”  
 Finally, there is a large recent theoretical literature on two-sided media markets. 
Prominent among these papers is Anderson and Coate (2005), which shows that television 
markets can fail by providing too many ads when available programs are poor substitutes, or too 
few when viewers are quick to switch and advertisers’ profits are large relative to viewers’ 
disutility of ads. Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) model both the market for advertising sales and its 
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subsequent effects on a product market. They show that media outlets can benefit by selling 
exclusive advertising, since this softens product-market competition and raises advertisers’ 
willingness to pay. Liu, Putler, and Weinberg (2004) show that networks’ program investments 
may decrease with entry of additional networks. Our paper is relevant to this literature insofar as 
our results inform the assumptions it makes about how viewers respond to advertising of various 
types. The literature is reviewed by Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006). 
 Our contributions to knowledge about audience reactions to advertising and product 
placement are as follows. We examine several functional forms and find the magnitude of these 
effects contradict some recently published evidence. We estimate these effects using a dataset 
that is about 25 times larger (in terms of programs and time periods) than any studied previously. 
We generate important new findings about what advertisement characteristics influence audience 
responsiveness to advertising; this knowledge should be actionable to policymakers and 
managers in a variety of industries. To our knowledge, our study is the first to estimate the effect 
of product placements on viewer switching using field data. Our findings have implications for 
how laboratory studies of product placement should be designed. Taken as a whole, our results 
have important implications for television networks’ business models and consequently viewers’ 
leisure time and marketers’ advertising expenditures.  
   
2. A Model of Television Viewing Behavior 
In this section we describe our model of television viewing demand. We follow previous 
literature by assuming that each television viewer watches one network at a time, and model 
program viewership in a discrete choice framework. Given the aggregate nature of our data, we 
use a random coefficients logit model in the spirit of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995 and 
Nevo (2001). We include the essential details in the body of the paper and refer interested 
readers to the technical appendix for discussions of methodological issues.  
 Traditionally, a rating is the fraction of all potential viewers who watched a given 
program. A share is the fraction of all viewers watching television who watched a given 
program. Our data measure program ratings, so we use this terminology throughout the paper. 
Similarly, we use the term “product placement” to refer to the inclusion of brands or products 
within television programs, which is sometimes called “branded entertainment,” “plugs,” or “tie-
ins.” We refer to blocks of time sold to advertisers as “traditional advertising” or simply 
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“advertising.” We use the terms “program” and “show” interchangeably. Finally, an “ad 
creative” is a set of visual and audio stimuli encoded in a video file. 
  We index networks with n and programs with j. A viewer chooses from tNn ...1  
networks airing top-100 programs within half hour t.8 There exists a one-to-one mapping from 
network-half hours (nt) to program-half hours (jt).9 
 Viewer utility is determined by time effects, program and network characteristics, 
advertising and product placement, and preference parameters. The indirect utility viewer i 
derives from watching network n in half hour t is given by 
                              intntintintntint Xqpvu   );,(  (1)  
where ntp  is the number of seconds of product placements on network n during half-hour t, ntq  
is the number of seconds of traditional advertising on network n during half-hour t, i is a vector 
of utility parameters, and );,( intnt qpv   is the utility obtained from advertising and product 
placement. In section 5, we report results for several specifications of );,( intnt qpv  .  
 The ntX  vector contains program, network, and time data. These include program 
dummies that capture the program characteristics (genre etc), a dummy for whether the airing 
was a new episode; network-day dummies, to capture networks’ historical schedule strengths and 
weaknesses; half-hour effects, to allow television utility to vary over the course of the night; and 
season-week dummies, to allow the utility of watching television to vary over weeks and years. 
Many previous studies (e.g., Moshkin and Shachar 2002) demonstrate the importance of state 
dependence in television viewing, so we also include the network’s audience rating for the same 
weekday-half hour in each of the previous five weeks.10  
 In entertainment categories like television shows, observed product characteristics are 
often inadequate to capture product quality.. The nt  term represents  time-changing 
characteristics of the program that are unobserved to the researcher but known by viewers, 
advertisers, and networks. Note that the time-constant component is captured by the program 
                                                 
8 Our audience datasource is a set of weekly “top 100” programs, described further in section 3. 
9 We could alternatively think of a consumer choosing a program-half hour combination. To be consistent with 
previous literature we model the viewer’s decision as choosing a network-half hour. 
10 Many programs are serial in nature, so previous weeks’ ratings are likely to predict demand for the current 
program.  
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dummies, so that the nt  reflect variation in episode quality.  
 Equation 2 defines the distribution of the random utility parameters.   
                                  i
i
i 
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i  represents viewer tastes that are not observed by the econometrician and is a K-dimensional 
vector drawn from a multivariate standard normal distribution. We assume that the i  are 
independently normally distributed across the population with mean zero and variance 1.  The   
term is a diagonal KxK scaling matrix of parameters (the standard deviations of the random 
coefficients) to be estimated.11 We assume that the i are independent of int .  
 The number of parameters K can be as large as the combined dimensions of i  and i , 
but is typically chosen to be smaller, as estimation time increases exponentially in K. We could 
include individual demographics drawn from population-level distributions in Equation (2), but 
given that we do not have meaningful variation in viewer demographics over markets or time, it 
is not clear that these effects would be separately identified from  . However, as we discuss in 
section 5, we estimate a restricted model separately for each demographic group in our data and 
hence our parameter estimates vary over demographic groups.  
 The int  is distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value across viewers, networks, and time 
periods. If we restrict the elements of   to zero,  we have specified a multinomial logit model.  
We can rewrite equation 1 as (all specifications of  );,( intnt qpv   are linear in the random 
coefficient) 
                                                              intintntintu    (3) 
where ntntntntnt Xqpv   );,(  captures the base utility every viewer derives from 
network n at time t. The composite random shock, intint   , captures viewer preference 
heterogeneity.  
 Viewers may elect to watch a a program outside the top 100, a cable network, or engage 
in a non-television activity. The value of the best available alternative (the “outside option”) is 
given by 
                                                 
11 Including random coefficients ensures that predicted switching patterns will be based on similarity in observed 
characteristics, rather than based solely on similarity in audience ratings. 
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                                                              tittiu 000    (4) 
Given that we cannot identify relative utility levels, we normalize t0  to zero. The conditional 
probability that viewer i watches network n at time t is 
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The audience rating for network n at time t is  
                                               
ntA
intnt dFss )(  (7) 
where )(F  denotes the cumulative distribution function of  , which is assumed to be 
independent of the logit error term.  Notice that network n’s audience rating is a function of 
network and program characteristics and advertising for all programs.   
  
 
3. Data  
To estimate the model we use data from two sources: TNS Media Intelligence (TNS) and the 
Television Bureau of Advertising (TVB). The TNS data are extensive and contain program genre 
classifications, detailed advertising data at the level of the individual ad placement, and detailed 
product placement data at the level of the individual product placement. The TVB data report 
television audience ratings at the date-network-program level for the top 100 national programs 
that aired during prime time evening hours each week (8-11 P.M.) during which networks earn 
61% of their advertising revenues.  
 Since programs typically change on half-hour increments, our unit of observation is the 
date-network-half-hour, e.g. January 1, 2007, ABC, 8:00-8:30 P.M. We discuss each component 
of the data in more detail, and present descriptive statistics in section 3.5. 
 
 
3.1 Program Data 
Program characteristics data come from TNS and consist of program name, genre, network, and 
date of each airing. We observe each advertisement within each program, so we are able to 
construct start and end times for each program-date.  
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 The networks in the data are ABC, CBS, CW, FOX, NBC, UPN, and WB.12 FOX 
broadcasted national programs 8-10 on all seven nights (all times are P.M., Eastern Standard 
Time). UPN broadcasted 8-10 Monday through Friday, and WB broadcasted 8-10 Sunday 
through Friday. WB and UPN merged and began broadcasting as the CW Network in September 
2006. CW broadcasted 8-10 Sunday through Friday in the 2006-07 season.  
 TNS assigns each program to a genre. Numerous studies (e.g. Rust and Alpert 1984, 
Goettler and Shachar 2001) illustrate the importance of program genre in predicting program 
viewing demand. Table 1 lists the genres ordered by the frequency of the network-half-hours in 
which they are programmed in the sample. Genres range from News Magazine to Wrestling. But 
the striking feature of the data is its relative lack of dispersion. Four genres—Drama/Adventure, 
Slice-of-Life, Situation Comedy, and Police/Suspense/Mystery—accounted for 76.4% of prime-
time network program-hours. At the other end of the distribution, 30 genres account for just 
7.02%.  
 
Genre Frequency Genre Frequency
Drama/Adventure 34.21% Game Show 1.66%
Slice-of-Life (or "Reality") 16.08% Professional Football - Game 1.14%
Situation Comedy 14.70% Award/Pageant/Parade/Celebration 1.04%
Police/Suspense/Mystery 11.45% Variety - General 0.99%
Feature Film 5.49% Professional Baseball - Game 0.98%
News Magazine 5.11% College Football - Game 0.55%
Wrestling 2.08% Other 4.51%  
Table 1. Genre Frequency 
 
3.2. Advertising Data 
We use advertising data from TNS Media Intelligence’s “Stradegy” database. This database 
provides advertisers, advertising agencies, and other marketers with “competitive advertising 
intelligence.” It is widely subscribed within the industry.  
 For all advertisements that aired during the sample period, we observe the brand 
advertised (e.g. Coca-Cola Classic), the network, start time, and length of the ad, and a name 
                                                 
12 FOX started a new network called My Network Television in 2006, but none of its program audiences were large 
enough to be included in our sample. 
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given to the ad creative. In addition, TNS manually classified each brand as belonging to a 
category (e.g. Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks), an industry (Beverages), a subsidiary (Coca-
Cola USA) and a parent company (Coca-Cola Co.).  
 Networks aired about 250,000 advertisements during our sample period. These included 
about 29,000 different ad creatives for 5,000 brands spanning 350 categories in 50 industries.  
 We have data on the average price of a 30-second commercial for each program on each 
date. Networks report these date-program average advertising costs to TNS and Nielsen after 
their programs air. These data allow media buyers to estimate costs of future media plans. If 
networks over-report these costs, they have a greater ability to give advertisers perceived 
discounts when negotiating ad prices, but they may limit their programs’ potential advertising 
demand. We are not aware of any evidence of systematic under- or over-reporting, perhaps 
because of the repeated nature of transactions in this industry. (These are not “rate card” data.) 
 
3.3. Product Placement Data 
TNS Media Intelligence began recording product placement information on March 28, 2005. In 
their database, a product placement is a visual, audio, or audio-visual representation of a brand or 
product, whether explicit or implied. Common examples include detailed prize descriptions on a 
game show, a logo on the t-shirt of a reality show contestant, or a partially identifiable truck 
driven by a police officer in a dramatic series.  
 For each product placement, we observe the brand placed, the brand characteristics 
defined above, and the product placement characteristics listed in Table 2. In the median 
placement, an identifiable product or package is shown in the foreground with no other brands or 
products on the screen. Products are integrated into the program’s plot in just 16% of all 
placements. As with advertising, we aggregate over placements to construct measures of product 
placement at the date-network-half-hour level.  
 Networks typically do not reveal placement terms, so no available datasource reports 
product placement prices. Our understanding of the industry is that product placements are 
sometimes paid in cash, sometimes bartered, and sometimes are not paid. Payment is more likely 
when plot integration or character interaction occurs, in which case the integration or interaction 
almost always depicts the brand or product favorably and/or prominently.  
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 In the product placement data, we observe episode names for regular programs. 
Therefore, for the second and third television seasons in our data, we were able to construct an  
 
Variable Notes
Type Verbal Only 17.0%
Direct Visual Only 51.2% Brand/product is clearly identifiable
Implied Visual Only 24.5% Brand/product is not clearly identifiable
Verbal & Direct Visual 5.3%
Verbal & Implied Visual 2.0%
Appearance Product or Package shown 63.9%
Brand Name shown 11.4%
Brand Mark shown 4.6%
Billboard or Graphic Overlay 3.1%
No Visual 17.0%
Interaction Interaction w/ Real Life Persona 21.6%
Interaction w/ Fictional Character 37.4%
No Interaction 41.0%
Brand Interaction 7.9% E.g. a character wears a shirt with a Nike logo
Product Interaction (Proper Use) 33.2%
Product Interaction (Improper Use) 1.0%
No Interaction 57.8%
Integration Integration as a Prize or Reward 1.3% Characters who successfully completed a game or contest were 
given the brand as a reward
Integrated Directly into Game/Contest 2.8% The brand/product was featured during the game/contest
Integrated Partially Into Game/Contest 1.3% The brand/product was used during the game/contest
Integration as a Sponsorship 8.2% The brand was presented as a sponsor of the program
Other Integration 2.6% E.g. the brand was integrated with the plot of a dramatic program
No Integration 83.9%
Visibility Fully Visible 39.8%
Partially Visible 40.6%
Not Applicable 19.6%
Clutter No Clutter 58.1%
Clutter 24.9% At least 1 other brand/product appeared on screen during a visual 
product placement
Not Applicable 17.0%
Foreground 60.7%
Background 22.2%
Not Applicable 17.0%
Length in Seconds Mean 23.4
Med. 9.0
St.D. 42.3
Max 920.0
Visual 
Interaction 
Type
Visual 
Location
 
Table 2. Product Placement Descriptive Statistics. 
 
indicator of whether each episode had appeared previously in the television season.13  We call 
this variable NewEps. It stands to reason that new program episodes are more attractive to 
                                                 
13 We were not able to observe this for the first season since the product placement data sample did not begin until 
March 2005. 
13 
viewers than previously-aired episodes (“re-runs”), so we use this information in predicting 
viewing demand. 
 
3.4 Television Audience Data 
Only a handful of television audience datasets have been available to academic researchers in the 
past 20 years. Most of those contain individual viewers’ program choices over a limited number 
of days and programs. Our data contrast with others in that we have an unusually large number 
of time periods and programs, but we do not have cross-sectional variation over individuals or 
markets.  
 We collected our audience data from weekly “top 100” program lists found on the TVB 
website (tvb.org). Each list ordered the 100 highest-rated programs that week and included the 
programs’ national audiences, as measured by Nielsen Media Research. 
 The audience measurements are collected in the following way. Television usage and 
tuning in a geographically representative sample of approximately 9,000 households are 
monitored continuously using Peoplemeters. Viewers in those households are prompted to “log 
in” every 20-40 minutes they watch television; the log-in data are used to construct the 
demographic ratings. The Peoplemeter records viewing for each viewer that is “logged in” for 
each network in each second of each minute of the day. The program audience ratings are then 
constructed as averages over the network-day-minute-seconds in which that program aired. For 
example, if a viewer in the Nielsen sample watches NBC from 8-8:20 and then watches ABC 
from 8:20-8:30, that viewer accounts for “two-thirds” of a viewer for NBC in the 8-8:30 half 
hour, and “one-third” of a viewer for ABC from 8-8:30. 
 Weekly top-100 program lists were available for three demographic groups in each of 
three 35-week television “seasons,” 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07. Each season began on the 
third Monday of September and ended on the third Sunday in May. The demographic groups are 
those traditionally used to measure television audiences: adults aged 18-49, adults aged 25-54, 
and households. The unit of observation is a date-network-program, so we assign each date-
network-program rating to the network-half-hour in which that program aired.  
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3.5. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 displays advertising and audience descriptive statistics by network. CBS had the largest 
audience measured in households, by far, with an average rating of 8.24, followed by ABC 
(6.55) and NBC (6.33). Yet FOX led in advertisers’ most desired demographic, adults 18-49 
(4.15), followed by CBS (3.93) and ABC (3.77). This lead in adults 18-49 yielded Fox’s premier 
position in advertising revenues per half hour. 
Network Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
ABC
Ad Seconds 370.48 375 87.70 15 900
PP Seconds 42.58 0 128.52 0 3537
Ad Dollars $1,767,586 $1,311,500 $1,604,577 $0 $28,800,000
Households 6.55 5.54 3.34 1.9 25.43
Adults 18-49 3.77 3 2.29 0.95 16.52
Adults 25-54 4.29 3.5 2.52 1.21 17.69
CBS
Ad Seconds 309.03 300 90.69 30 1320
PP Seconds 110.78 14 209.73 0 1850
Ad Dollars $1,787,248 $1,377,200 $1,713,685 $0 $38,200,000
Households 8.24 7.6 3.23 2.3 42.6
Adults 18-49 3.93 3.44 2.12 1.05 35.2
Adults 25-54 4.90 4.4 2.43 1.28 37.1
CW
Ad Seconds 340.28 345 80.19 90 630
PP Seconds 84.50 4 174.66 0 1652
Ad Dollars $568,699 $582,150 $356,235 $0 $2,250,000
Households 2.71 2.7 0.46 1.8 4.2
Adults 18-49 1.72 1.6 0.41 1.1 3
Adults 25-54 1.70 1.7 0.31 1.1 2.5
FOX
Ad Seconds 295.75 290 80.04 40 1200
PP Seconds 141.25 17 311.82 0 7378
Ad Dollars $1,809,352 $1,124,200 $2,379,358 $0 $62,400,000
Households 6.20 4.6 4.38 1.81 41.13
Adults 18-49 4.15 3 3.20 1.11 33.22
Adults 25-54 4.38 3 3.52 1.05 35.58
NBC
Ad Seconds 318.34 325 81.89 0 1305
PP Seconds 129.73 7 332.07 0 4714
Ad Dollars $1,585,175 $1,311,000 $1,242,212 $0 $10,100,000
Households 6.33 5.9 2.35 1.91 16.4
Adults 18-49 3.45 3.06 1.54 1.04 10
Adults 25-54 4.03 3.6 1.73 1.3 11.4
UPN
Ad Seconds 334.09 330 67.61 120 720
PP Seconds 127.11 49 189.06 0 1557
Ad Dollars $507,876 $452,550 $355,769 $36,000 $1,922,400
Households 2.81 2.73 0.54 1.81 4.71
Adults 18-49 1.71 1.64 0.39 1 3.22
Adults 25-54 1.70 1.68 0.33 1.02 3.22
WB
Ad Seconds 348.80 360 73.15 90 690
PP Seconds 69.02 16 119.15 0 1049
Ad Dollars $714,339 $655,500 $272,382 $98,400 $2,235,300
Households 2.94 2.82 0.67 1.69 5.38
Adults 18-49 1.84 1.78 0.46 0.85 3
Adults 25-54 1.85 1.81 0.43 0.99 2.85
An observation is a date-network-half hour. Product placement data begin March 28, 2005, 27 weeks 
later than the advertising and audience data.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
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 WB and UPN had audiences and advertising revenues about half as large as the big four 
networks. It is surprising to compare the CW network’s performance to WB and UPN. CW had 
smaller audiences than either of its constituent networks, and lower average advertising revenues 
than UPN. It would appear that the WB-UPN merger was unprofitable, unless it produced 
substantial unobserved program cost savings.  
 ABC carried the highest advertising loads in the sample, with an average of 370 seconds 
of ads per half-hour. It was followed by WB (349), CW (340), UPN (334), NBC (318), CBS 
(309), and FOX (296). There was a great deal of dispersion around these means, with standard 
deviations about 25% as large as means of advertising time.14 Figure 2 shows histograms of ad 
seconds by network. It appears that networks followed somewhat different strategies in setting ad 
levels. For example, ABC had substantially more dispersion in ad time than FOX or UPN. CBS’ 
distribution of ad seconds takes a sharp jump at 180. And CW’s distribution of advertising time 
is bimodal at about 270 and 360.  
                                                 
14 There were 1320 seconds (22 minutes) of advertising on CBS during the NFL Pre-Game Kickoff Show 
from 8:00-8:30pm EST on December 10, 2006.  
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Figure 2. Histograms of Ad Seconds by Network 
 While FOX had the lowest advertising quantities, it carried the most product placement, 
with an average of 141 seconds per prime-time half-hour. This was followed by NBC (129), 
UPN (127), CBS (110), CW (85), WB (69) and ABC (43). Product placement time is skewed 
heavily toward the origin with 46% of network-half hours containing no product placements at 
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all. Product placements can overlap (multiple placements can be on the screen at once), leading 
to high maximal levels of product placement in a few cases. 
 Table 4 shows the raw correlations between the major variables. Notably, the correlation 
between advertising and product placement is close to zero. It is also notable that product 
placement time is positively correlated with audience ratings, with correlations ranging from 
0.13 to 0.17.  
Ad Sec. PP Sec. Ad Doll. HH A18-49 A25-54
Ad Seconds 1.00
Product Placement Seconds -0.04 1.00
Ad Dollars 0.33 0.12 1.00
Household Rating 0.02 0.13 0.66 1.00
Adults 18-49 Rating 0.05 0.17 0.72 0.92 1.00
Adults 25-54 Rating 0.04 0.16 0.70 0.96 0.99 1.00
Drama/Adventure 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
Police/Suspense/Mystery -0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.11
Situation Comedy 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.18 -0.11 -0.13
Slice-of-Life ("Reality") 0.03 0.30 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.10  
Table 4. Correlations among Key Variables 
 
 Slice-of-Life and Situation Comedy programs contain more advertising and product 
placement time than Drama/Adventure and Police/Suspense/Mystery programs. While audiences  
across demographic groups are highly correlated, genre preferences depend on demographics. 
Household-level audiences are more likely to watch police programs than adults 18-49 (0.18 
correlation to 0.07), while adults 18-49 are more likely to watch reality programs than the 
households audience (0.14 to 0.05). 
 
4. Estimation 
In this section we discuss potential endogeneity issues and how we address them and the 
estimation technique.  We discussion identification and more details in the technical appendix. 
 
4.1 Endogeneity 
The error term in the model is nt , which represents program characteristics that may be known 
to the networks and viewers but are unobserved by the econometrician. We specify   
                                                  ntjnt    (8) 
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where j  is the mean of unobserved characteristics for program j, and the nt  term represents 
deviations from this mean over time periods in which the program airs. (Recall that there is a 
one-to-one mapping from nt into jt, so we could equivalently write jt  in place of nt .) We 
use the serial nature of the data to estimate j  by including program-specific fixed effects. The 
nt  could capture unobserved temporal variation in program quality as some episodes of a 
program may be more entertaining than others. It could also capture variation in time given to 
tune-ins. To address this, we include ad price per viewer and its lags in the viewer utility 
function as this variable is likely to be correlated with tune-in seconds.15 We include NewEps, 
network-weekday and season-week dummies in ntX  to try to reduce variation in nt  due to 
episode quality, networks’ historical schedule strength, and temporally variable factors like 
weather. 
 Television networks may know their programs’ and episodes’ quality, including those 
aspects captured in nt , and may take it into account when setting traditional advertising and 
product placement levels. As a result we have a potential endogeneity problem in that advertising 
choices may be functions of nt . 
 We use three sets of instruments to address potential remaining endogeneity issues: (1) 
lags of traditional advertising time, (2) lags of product placement time, and (3) functions of 
competitors’ program characteristics. Regarding the first two sets of instruments, traditional 
advertising time and product placement seconds are autocorrelated (1-week correlations of 0.42 
and 0.44, respectively), so lags are good proxies for current advertising time and product 
placements. Their exclusion from the viewer utility function is justified if networks are myopic 
when setting traditional advertising time and product placements.16 The intuition motivating the 
third set of instruments follows Goeree (2008) and is similar to that used by BLP to correct for 
endogeneity of price in differentiated products markets. Rivals’ program characteristics enter the 
network’s profit function and therefore influence the network’s choice of ad and product 
placement time, since the optimal amount of advertising to do on a program depends upon the 
characteristics of all of the programs aired by rivals. Hence, characteristics of rivals’ programs 
                                                 
15 We originally treated ad price per viewer as an instrument, but instrumental variables validity tests reported in 
Appendix 1 indicated that their exclusion from viewer utility was not justified. 
16 Our approach is analogous to Villa-Boas and Winer (1999) who show that lagged variables are valid instruments 
in this setting. We also include program fixed effects. 
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and various combinations of these characteristics can be used to instrument for endogenous 
advertising in that they are correlated with advertising aired during program j but not with 
program j’s unobserved quality. These instruments are given by ntg , where g is the number of 
competing networks offering a program with characteristic g within date/half-hour t. The 
characteristics g that we consider are NewEps and genre effects. Finally, for validity of these 
instruments and to identify the taste parameters (discussed in the next section), we assume (as in 
BLP and Nevo, 2000) that the observed and unobserved program characteristics are mean 
independent.17  
 
4.2. Estimation 
The econometric technique follows recent studies of differentiated products, such as BLP (1995) 
and Nevo (2000). We estimate the model using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
The moments match the predicted demographic audience ratings for network-half hours nt to the 
corresponding observed ratings.  
Following the literature, we assume that the demand unobservables (evaluated at the true 
parameter values) are mean independent of a set of exogenous instruments, z. To estimate the 
restricted model we follow Berry (1994). Setting K0 , the model in section 2 reduces to a 
multinomial logit with an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimating equation of 
                    ntjntntntnttnt Xpqvss   );,(lnln 0   (9)  
where ts0  is the audience rating of the outside good (one minus the sum of the “inside” shares). 
To estimate the parameters we interact the error term nt  with a set of variables, Z. In our first 
set of regressions, Z includes all the right-hand side variables, i.e.  program dummies, season-
week dummies, network-weekday dummies, half-hour dummies, genre dummies, NewEps, five 
(weekly) lags of audience share and ad price per viewer, product placement characteristics, and 
the observed data in );,( ntnt qpv . In the instrumental variables (IV) specifications, we add five 
lags of traditional advertising time and five lags of product placement time into Z and exclude 
advertising and product placement time that are potentially endogenous 
                                                 
17 Given that we observe variation in the programs offered in different time slots, these instruments are valid even 
though we estimate program fixed effects. 
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 To estimate the full set of random coefficients, we add the competitors’ program 
characteristics described above to Z along with the lags of advertising and product placement 
time, and adopt the two-step estimator proposed by BLP.   See the technical appendix for details.  
 
5. Results 
In sections 5.1-5.3 we present estimates from several specifications of the multinomial logit 
(MNL) model without random coefficients. The ease of MNL estimation makes it helpful for 
specification testing and computing estimates for models with large numbers of parameters. 
However, its assumption of preference homogeneity implies that its counterfactual predictions 
will be affected by the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives property. We 
therefore use the random coefficient logit model to estimate how audiences respond to changes 
in advertising time in section 5.4. 
 
5.1. Audience Reactions to Advertising and Product Placement 
We use show dummies to control for unobserved program characteristics. Without show 
dummies, we would expect advertising responsiveness to be biased upward, since networks 
would include higher ad levels in programs with higher unobserved quality. As table 5 shows, 
without show dummies we find that both advertising and product placements have significant, 
positive effects on utility. This is counterintuitive as it suggests viewers enjoy watching 
advertising on average. When we add show dummies, the point estimates fall markedly, and 
advertising time is again significant, but this time with the opposite sign. These results indicate 
that show dummies mitigate some of the endogeneity issues associated with advertising. 
 Our other endogeneity controls are instrumental variables (IVs) for intertemporal 
variation in unobserved program characteristics and unobserved tune-in levels. We present the 
results of several tests of our IVs in the Technical Appendix. To summarize, we found that lags 
of advertising and product placements are useful instruments for current advertising and product  
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Results without 
show dummies
Results with 
show dummies
Ad Seconds 1.15E-04 -9.77E-05
(3.00) (3.03)
Product Placement Seconds 2.81E-05 -1.75E-05
(2.25) (1.38)
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.82
T-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable is the log-transform of 
the audience rating among adults 18-49.
 
Table 5. Multinomial Logit Estimates of Advertising and Product Placement Parameters  
 
placement time, but using IVs does not materially affect the estimates. We proceed with MNL 
estimation without IVs on efficiency grounds.  The point estimates imply the total effect of 
advertising is to significantly lower utility by about -0.029 (given that an average time slot has 
300 seconds of advertising).   This is a large effect relative to the increase in utility from 
watching a  program. 
 In section 5.4, we consider what specification for );,( ntnt qpv  best fits the data. We 
know of no extant theory available to guide our selection. It seems reasonable to expect that 
viewers’ marginal utility of advertising and product placement may be nonlinear.  We followed 
two common procedures to select a functional form; both led to the same conclusion. First, we 
used splines with varying numbers of knots to estimate the shape of the advertising and product 
placement utility function. Second, we added powers of each term to a linear specification and 
stopped when the next power added was not statistically significant. Both methods indicated that 
);,( ntnt qpv  should be cubic in advertising time, and quadratic in product placement time. We 
found no evidence of interactions between advertising and product placement.  
 Recall we estimated the model separately for each demographic group. Figure 3 shows 
the estimated marginal utility of advertising for each of the three demographic groups. The 
household demographic group is less averse to advertising than the other two, but there is no 
apparent difference between adults 18-49 and adults 25-54. The differences emphasize how 
much more ad-averse adults 18-54 are than other viewers, since the households demographic 
group includes adults 18-49 and adults 25-54. Ad utility is everywhere decreasing, with an 
inflection point at 407 seconds. Just 16% of observed ad levels exceed this inflection point. 
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 Figure 3. Estimated Marginal Utility of Ad Seconds 
 Figure 4 shows viewers’ estimated marginal utility of product placement seconds. 
Product placement marginal utility is concave, but increasing and positive over most of the 
variable’s range. Households appear to get the highest marginal benefit from product placement, 
followed by adults 25-54 and adults 18-49.  
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Figure 4. Estimated Marginal Utility of Product Placements 
 
 While we have included several endogeneity controls, the product placement results still 
may be biased. It could be the case that product placements are naturally accommodated by 
certain types of program scenes that contain unobserved characteristics that are attractive to 
viewers. For example, if high-budget program scenes are more likely to attract viewers, and 
contain increased levels of product placement, our finding of positive product placement 
marginal utility could be spurious. Such content could vary over episodes within a program and 
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therefore escape the control provided by our program dummies. This problem seems unlikely to 
affect our advertising utility estimates since advertising content is less influenced by program 
content. 
 We collected some additional data to investigate this possibility. The website TV.com 
aggregates viewers’ ratings of television programs and episodes. We supplemented these data 
with information from our sample, so we were able to separately control for episode quality and 
product placement. When we did this, we found that the estimated effect of product placement 
time on utility was negative and significant. We describe the procedure and results in detail in 
the Appendix. We report some additional results related to product placement characteristics in 
the Technical Appendix.  
 Adults 25-54 appear to have a nearly equal reaction to ads as adults 18-49. Households 
are the least valuable audience metric and seem to be least negatively affected by  advertising. 
From here on, we focus on models estimated using audience data for adults 18-49, as they are the 
group valued most highly by advertisers. 
 
5.2. Ad Utility by Product Category 
To estimate the effect of product category advertising on utility we set 
                                             
c
q
ccnt
c
p
ccntntnt qpqpv  );,(  (10) 
where cntp  is the product placement time given to brands in category c on network n in half-hour 
t, and cntq  is the corresponding ad time.  
 Table 6 gives the MNL significant estimates of pc  and qc . The results are as to be 
expected, as the highest significant category ad effects include movies, DVDs, light beer, regular 
beer, and four automotive categories. More surprising was the appearance of finance-related 
categories, including banks, insurance, and financial services. We reviewed some of these ads to 
try to understand the results further. Our general sense is that these ads contain higher 
entertainment value and production budgets than the typical ad, perhaps because they seek to 
capture consumer attention for products that might not otherwise be enjoyable to think about. 
The most-liked categories were corporate computing and participatory sports, though both 
represent a very small share of total advertising dollars. Corporate computing was dominated by 
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a highly entertaining branding campaign by IBM, while the highest-spending brand in 
participatory sports was 1-800-SKYDIVE.18 
 
Category
Point Est. 
(T-Stat)
% All Ad 
Seconds
% All Ad 
Dollars Category
Point Est. 
(T-Stat)
% All Ad 
Seconds
% All Ad 
Dollars
Computers, Corporate 0.0026 (3.0) 0.07% 0.11% Prescription Medications -0.0002 (-2.7) 7.06% 6.33%
Participatory Sports 0.0024 (2.8) 0.03% 0.06% Wireless Telecom Providers -0.0003 (-2.6) 6.09% 6.05%
Light Beer & Ale 0.0024 (2.8) 0.40% 0.78% Toothpaste & Whiteners -0.0007 (-2.1) 0.59% 0.57%
Regular Beer & Ale 0.0023 (5.6) 0.13% 0.30% Stationery, Greeting Cards -0.0009 (-3.4) 0.48% 0.37%
Ice Cream 0.0014 (2.2) 0.18% 0.23% Candy & Mints -0.0011 (-2.9) 0.62% 0.53%
Home Audio Equipment 0.0013 (2.2) 0.29% 0.39% Real Estate Agencies -0.0012 (-3.0) 0.54% 0.46%
Financial Products and Services 0.0013 (2.6) 0.32% 0.36% Cookies & Crackers -0.0012 (-2.3) 0.32% 0.28%
Cars, European 0.0012 (2.7) 0.46% 0.62% Mouthwashes & Breath Fresheners -0.0013 (-2.9) 0.37% 0.30%
Courier Services 0.0012 (3.3) 0.35% 0.53% Diapers (Adult, Infant And Toddler) -0.0016 (-2.3) 0.14% 0.11%
Cars, Domestic 0.0012 (2.7) 0.75% 0.98% Bleach & Fabric Softeners -0.0018 (-2.4) 0.12% 0.10%
Motion Pictures 0.0011 (4.5) 5.76% 6.28% Spectator Sporting Events -0.0019 (-2.5) 0.14% 0.09%
Insurance 0.0010 (8.7) 0.31% 0.36% Shoe Stores -0.0019 (-2.0) 0.14% 0.11%
Diet Carbonated Soft Drinks 0.0009 (2.0) 0.50% 0.65% Apparel -0.0020 (-2.1) 0.08% 0.09%
Pre-Recorded Video & DVDs 0.0008 (2.0) 1.86% 1.92% Pharmacies -0.0025 (-3.0) 0.08% 0.07%
Banks, S&Ls 0.0007 (2.7) 0.70% 0.75% Vegetable Juices -0.0027 (-2.3) 0.07% 0.06%
Light Trucks, Asian 0.0006 (2.0) 1.83% 2.04%
Light Trucks, Domestic 0.0005 (2.7) 2.48% 3.28%
Positive Category Advertising Effectsa Negative Category Advertising Effectsa
a Only effects significant at the 95% confidence level are shown, for categories that spent >= .05% of total advertising dollars.  
Table 6. Category Advertising Utility 
 
 The estimates indicate that viewers are averse to advertising in a variety of categories. 
Many are low-involvement categories like toothpaste, candy, cookies, and mouthwash. Others 
may have negative product associations such as diapers, vegetable juices, bleach, or pharmacies. 
Prescription medications and wireless telecommunications are the two highest spending 
categories that decrease average viewer utility. Prescription medication ad utility may be 
impacted by US Food and Drug Administration rules regarding disclosure of medication side 
effects. 
 
5.3. Ad Utility by Advertising Creative 
Our other substantive question is how individual advertisements vary in their effects on viewer 
utility. We respecify ad utility as  
                                                 
18 Positive effects may be interpreted as categories whose ads discourage viewer switching in such a way as to 
increase Nielsen audience measurements, or capture the attention of viewers leaving other channels who then 
continue viewing the network. 
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where hntq  is the number of ad seconds devoted to creative h on network n at time t, h  is the 
effect of creative h on utility, and ntq0  is the amount of all ad time given to creatives that are not 
in the set 1…H. We choose ad creatives to include in H by following two steps. First, TNS 
creative names sometimes include an integer at the end, to indicate that the creative is a minor 
departure from a previously-logged commercial for the same brand. Typically these departures 
are 15 second versions of a 30-second ad, or a change in on-screen text in an otherwise identical 
ad. We drop this integer to pool across variations within an ad creative, yielding about 24,000 ad 
creatives in the sample. Second, we define a dummy variable for each of the 350 ad creatives 
that occurred on television most frequently during the sample period we use in estimation. Thus 
H=350. Each ad described by a creative-specific utility parameter appeared at least 42 times. 
 
TNS Ad Creative Namea Brand
Point Est. 
(T-Stat)
%  of 
all ads
%  ad 
dollars
It's Ok To Look Match.Com Dating Service .005 (2.1) .04% .02%
Man Gets Locked Out In Bathrobe Burlington Coat Factory Men .005 (2.2) .04% .02%
Biggest Sale Of The Year JC Penney .004 (2.1) .03% .02%
No Title Assigned - #3726541 Boys & Girls Club/Psa .003 (2.4) .04% .04%
Man Drives Family To Gaze At Stars Toyota Trucks Sequoia .003 (3.3) .09% .11%
Tunics/Women Dance On Boat Old Navy Clothing Store .003 (2.4) .05% .07%
Duck Helps Couple Get By Aflac Medical Insurance .003 (2.2) .04% .04%
Trainer Gets Pumped Up From Song Verizon Wireless Service .002 (2.3) .05% .05%
Vehicle Drives On Building Edges Ford Trucks Edge .002 (2.0) .04% .09%
Molly's Chambers/Couple Dances Volkswagen Autos Jetta .002 (3.0) .06% .10%
Truck Performs Seesaw Ramp Trick Toyota Trucks Tundra .002 (2.4) .06% .08%
Woman Wakes Up In The Dark Lunesta Sleep Rx -.001 (-2.2) .08% .15%
Woman Had Mysterious Symptoms Requip Restless Legs Syndrm Rx -.001 (-2.0) .04% .07%
People...To Do/Prescription Assistance Humira Rheumatoid Arthritis Rx -.001 (-2.6) .04% .07%
No Title Assigned - #3978969 Foundation/Better Lf/Psa -.002 (-2.2) .08% .08%
Bubbles Flow Over Bottle & Teeth Listerine Whitening Rinse -.002 (-2.1) .05% .04%
Effortless Meticuless Fabuless Target Disc Multi-Pdts -.002 (-2.1) .04% .06%
Father Says He Got Hosed Verizon Wireless Service -.002 (-2.1) .05% .04%
Lust For Life/Women In Europe Royal Caribbean Cruises -.002 (-2.6) .06% .07%
Family Shareplan/Man Talks To Family Verizon Wireless Service -.002 (-2.3) .05% .04%
Women Walk Around City In Shorts Old Navy Clothing Store -.002 (-2.2) .04% .06%
Breast Meal/2Pc Meal/3 Strip Meal KFC Restaurant -.002 (-2.3) .05% .05%
Woman Acquires Boxes To Be Mailed USPS.com -.003 (-2.5) .05% .03%
Man Offers People Fast Relief Zantac 150 -.003 (-2.1) .03% .03%
Man Works At Vineyard Claritin Allergy Remedy -.003 (-2.4) .07% .05%
National Sales Race Nissan Autos Altima & Sentra -.003 (-2.0) .04% .03%
Push It/I365 Nextel Phone Sprint PCS Wireless Service -.003 (-2.0) .03% .03%
Tuscan Garlic Chicken Olive Garden Restaurant -.003 (-2.1) .06% .05%
No Hassle Rewards/Man Skis In Summer Capital One Mastercard & Visa -.003 (-3.0) .05% .04%
No Hassle Rewards/D Spade Answers No Capital One Mastercard & Visa -.003 (-2.3) .05% .06%
People Rinse Their Mouth With Product Listerine Mouthwash -.003 (-2.2) .04% .03%
1500 Whenever Mins/Cheerleader On Phone T-Mobile Wireless Service -.003 (-4.3) .09% .09%
A Night In...Castle Giveaway/Letterbox Disneyparks.Com Online -.004 (-3.3) .04% .03%
The Difference Between Services Blockbuster.Com Store Online -.004 (-3.6) .04% .04%
Men & Ellen At Reception Are Gellin Dr Scholls Massaging Gel Insoles -.004 (-2.3) .05% .03%
aOnly ad creative effects significant at the 95% level are shown.   
Table 7. Ad Creative Utility 
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 Of the 350 ad creative parameters, 35 were estimated to be significant at the 95% 
confidence level. Table 7 displays the creative names, brands, parameter estimates, and t-
statistics for each of those creatives. It also shows what fraction of all ads and ad dollars in the 
sample each creative accounted for. 
 We interpret these results with caution. We presume that most of the ad creatives in the 
sample have some effect on viewer utility, and we would be able to measure all of their effects if 
we had individual-level viewing data. We are looking here at the tails of the distribution of ad 
creative utility, among the ads that appeared most frequently.  
 With those caveats in mind, it is interesting to note what these ads do not have in 
common. It does not appear that brand identity is a primary driver of ad creative utility, as two 
brands (Verizon Wireless and Old Navy) have ad creatives with significant positive effects, as 
well as ad creatives with significant negative effects. However, none of the significant creative 
effects contradict the positive and negative category-specific effects presented above. 
 We watched the ads in Table 7 to try to get a general sense of what creative elements 
drive the results. We noticed that ads with significant positive effects tended to be upbeat and 
affirmative, and to feature actors that appeared younger than about 40 years old. One 
advertisement featured a popular celebrity (Denzel Washington) and another had a song from a 
popular band (Kings of Leon).  
 Ad creatives with significant negative effects were more likely to feature actors older 
than forty, convey negative messages, and depict scenes of frustration. Some contained what 
could be subjectively termed annoying stimuli, such as intentionally bad dancing (“Push It/I365 
Nextel Phone”), high-pitched, rapid speech (“1500 Whenever Mins/Cheerleader on Phone”), or 
actors using made-up words in conversation (“Men and Ellen at Reception are Gellin”). 
 The results suggest that, consistent with Woltman Elpers et al. (2003) and Teixeira et al. 
(2008), creative characteristics drive viewer acceptance of advertising. While we find these 
effects to be interesting, they are suggestive at best. We think there is scope for future research to 
use individual-level data to measure the effects of ad creative characteristics on viewers’ 
advertising utility.  
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5.4. Random coefficients logit results 
In this section we present results from the full random coefficients logit model, including the 
estimated elasticities of advertising. Our advertising utility specification is given by 
                                5
3
4
2
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2
1);,(  ntntintntintintnt qqqppqpv  . (12) 
 The main results are shown in Table 8. The point estimates of advertising and product 
placement have the same signs as those estimated in the multinomial logit model, but are not 
estimated as precisely. Most of the significant effects are those associated with the program 
dummies, network-day dummies, and half-hour dummies. Table 9 presents the highest estimated 
program effects. The top programs seem reasonable: American Idol, Desperate Housewives, 
Grey’s Anatomy, and Lost.  Table 10 shows the network-weekday point estimates. One of the 
highest significant estimates is NBC’s Thursday night, which is the only network-day to be 
branded in recent years (“Must See TV”).  
 
Regressor Coeff. Est. (T-Stat) Stat)
Ad Sec. -.00113 (-0.2) 0.1 (0.0)
(Ad Sec.)2 .00000 (0.0)
(Ad Sec.)3 .00000 (0.1)
PP Sec. .00000 (-0.1) 0.3 (0.0)
(PP Sec.)2 .00000 (-0.6)
NewEps 1.48984 (0.6)
1-week lag s nt .04335 (0.5)
2-week lag s nt .01432 (0.3)
3-week lag s nt .00989 (0.1)
4-week lag s nt .01269 (0.3)
5-week lag s nt .01376 (1.2)
Constant .18429 (1.3)
GMM Objective 8.4558
Pseudo R2 0.7499
Note: lags of s nt are the the previous week's audience rating 
on network n  at the same weekday/half-hour as t  
Table 8. Random Coefficients Model Parameter Estimates 
 
Program Coeff. Est. (T-Stat)
Program: American Idol 6.8E-1 (2.2)
Program: Desperate Housewives 5.9E-1 (4.6)
Program: Grey's Anatomy 5.3E-1 (5.4)
Program: Lost 5.2E-1 (3.2)
Program: House 4.4E-1 (1.7)
Program: 20/20 3.4E-1 (2.0)
Program: 24 3.3E-1 (2.6)  
Table 9. Selected Random Coefficent Model Program Fixed Effect Estimates 
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Regressor Coeff. Est. (T-Stat) Regressor Coeff. Est. (T-Stat)
ABC-Mon 0.18 (1.3) FOX-Mon 0.24 (2.5)
ABC-Tue 0.13 (1.5) FOX-Tue 0.20 (1.2)
ABC-Wed 0.11 (1.4) FOX-Wed 0.27 (2.7)
ABC-Thu 0.15 (1.8) FOX-Thu 0.11 (1.0)
ABC-Fri -0.23 (-1.8) FOX-Fri -0.31 (-1.9)
ABC-Sat -0.29 (-2.0) FOX-Sat 0.39 (0.7)
CBS-Sun 0.25 (0.9) NBC-Sun 0.05 (0.3)
CBS-Mon 0.48 (2.7) NBC-Mon 0.27 (2.6)
CBS-Tue 0.20 (1.5) NBC-Tue 0.23 (0.7)
CBS-Wed 0.15 (1.5) NBC-Wed 0.07 (0.8)
CBS-Thu 0.45 (1.6) NBC-Thu 0.40 (3.1)
CBS-Fri 0.04 (0.2) NBC-Fri -0.03 (-0.2)
CBS-Sat 0.08 (0.3) NBC-Sat -0.13 (-0.7)
FOX-Sun 0.49 (2.5) WB-Thu -0.26 (-1.8)
Note: ABC-Sun was chosen to be the excluded night. With one 
exception (WB-Thu), all CW-, UPN-, and WB-Weekday interactions 
were dropped due to scarcity of top-100 audience observations on those 
nights.  
Table 10. Random Coefficent Model Estimates of Network-Weekday Effects 
 
 We used the parameter estimations to compute median advertising elasticites (for details 
see the technical appendix) presented in Table 11.  The elasticities indicate that if a broadcast 
network unilaterally increases its advertising time by 10%, its median audience loss is about 
15%. The cross-elasticities are roughly comparable in nature across the “inside” networks and 
the outside option, but since the market share of the outside option is much larger than the sum 
of the ratings of the inside networks, this implies that when viewers leave an audience in 
response to an additional advertisement, they usually turn away from broadcast television 
altogether (tuning to a cable network, for example). 
 It is interesting to compare our elasticity estimates to those of Wilbur (2008b). He 
estimated a similar model using four weeks of audimeter/diary audience data from a cross-
section of local markets. He found that a 10% rise in advertising time caused a median 25% 
audience loss on highly-rated networks, and larger percentage audience losses for low-rated 
networks. Our elasticities are smaller and more homogeneous by comparison, though still 
substantial. The difference in our estimates can perhaps be attributed to the unreliability of diary 
data, which places a much higher burden on the audience member than the Peoplemeter 
technology used to produce our sample. 
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Network ABC CBS CW FOX NBC UPN WB
Outside 
Option
ABC -1.49 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04
CBS 0.08 -1.53 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05
CW 0.03 0.03 -1.49 0.03 0.03 -- -- 0.02
FOX 0.06 0.06 0.00 -1.45 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
NBC 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 -1.51 0.06 0.03 0.04
UPN 0.02 0.02 -- 0.02 0.02 -1.56 0.04 0.02
WB 0.02 0.02 -- 0.02 0.02 0.02 -1.51 0.03
a Table entry i,j  reports the estimated elasticity of option j's national audience 
in response to a 10% increase in network i's observed advertising level. 
Reported elasticities are the medians of the distribution of national audience 
elasticities over days and half-hours.  
Table 11. Random Coefficent Model Median Estimated Elasticities of Advertising. 
 
6. Discussion 
In light of the increasing importance of advertisement avoidance, we estimated a model of 
television viewing demand in which viewing decisions depend on program characteristics, 
scheduling factors, advertising time and characteristics, and product placement time and 
characteristics. Our key findings are that a unilateral 10% increase in advertising reduces a 
network’s audience by a median 15%, and audience responses to advertising seem to be driven 
by product category and ad content. When we control for episode quality, we find that product 
placement has a negative effect on viewer utility.  
 Our findings imply that networks ought to price discriminate among advertisers in order 
to maximize audience retention throughout their commercial breaks. There are three ways this 
could be done in practice. The simplest way would be to give ad price breaks to advertisers in 
categories which have traditionally been associated with high-utility ad creatives, such as beer, 
autos, movies, and finance-related categories. Accordingly, higher prices could be charged to 
those advertisers in categories that historically cause larger audience losses. 
 A more nuanced way to implement this would be to set up a system whereby advertisers 
submit their creatives to standardized tests of audience acceptance. For example, an ad creative 
could be vetted by an online consumer panel or inserted into network programming online (e.g., 
on Hulu.com), and observed viewer reactions could be used to measure viewer response to the 
ad. Given enough consumers in the panel and a standard approach toward testing creatives, a 
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formula could be devised to adjust the advertiser’s price. The attraction of this idea is that it 
would give advertisers an increased incentive to produce engaging advertising, and could 
possibly correct the currently unpriced externality in which an ad’s audience loss harms 
subsequent advertisers in the commercial break.  
 A third approach would be to base ad prices on more granular television audience 
measurements, such as second-by-second ratings currently extractable from the universe of 
digital cable boxes and digital video recorders (Wilbur 2008a). This would give advertisers the 
strongest incentives to avoid causing audience losses. However, it would be the most difficult to 
implement, since ownership of the most granular viewing data resides with multiple parties with 
potentially conflicting interests, and the television industry has historically been slow to agree 
upon and implement new metrics. 
 We view all three of these suggestions as realistic. The first can feasibly be implemented 
right away, while the second probably needs to be refined after a design and testing phase. The 
third suggestion is the most difficult to set up, but would have the most positive impact on the 
television industry’s collective health in the long run. It would also likely have the greatest effect 
on viewer welfare, which is consequential in an industry with such a large share of gross 
domestic leisure time.  
 Like all models, ours has several limitations which suggest directions for future research. 
We have not modeled viewer uncertainty about advertising and product placement time, as 
Anand and Shachar (2004, 2005) did in a related context. This is difficult to do reliably using 
aggregate rating data, but may be feasible using the approaches of Chen and Yang (2007) or 
Musalem, Bradlow and Raju (forthcoming). We also have not controlled for order of 
advertisement presentation. Finally, while we have used the best audience data available to us, 
there is scope for estimating a similar model using more granular data, such as commercial 
minute ratings or second-by-second set-top box data.
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Technical Appendix. 
TA.1. Model 
The number of parameters in  ,K, can be as large as the combined dimensions of i  and i , 
but is typically chosen to be smaller, as estimation time increases exponentially in K. We could 
include individual demographics drawn from population-level distributions in Equation (2), but 
given that we do not have meaningful variation in viewer demographics over markets or time, it 
is not clear that these effects would be separately identified from  .  
 We can rewrite equation 1 as  
                                                              intintntintu    (TA1) 
where ntjntntntnt Xqpv   );,(  captures the base utility every viewer derives from 
network n at time t. The composite random shock, intint   , captures viewer preference 
heterogeneity.  
 
TA.2. Data  
There were a few programs that appeared on more than one network over the course of the 
sample. When this occurred, we defined a separate program-network for each instance of the 
program. 
 Our unit of observation is a date-network-half-hour, but a network occasionally aired 
more than one program per half-hour slot. This affected less than 1% of the half-hours in our 
sample and was usually related to sports programming. For example, a game ran longer than its 
scheduled timeslot, or a half-hour included both a “pre-game show” and part of a game (two 
separate programs for which we observe separate audience ratings). We therefore had to choose 
which program’s audience rating to assign to some date-network-half-hours shared by two 
programs. We followed a two-step procedure. If exactly one of the two programs did not appear 
in any other half-hours, then we assigned that program’s audience rating to the half-hour. If both 
programs spanned multiple half-hours, then we assumed the program that contained more 
advertising during the date-network-half-hour in question accurately reflected the true audience 
rating. It was never the case that neither program spanned multiple half-hours. 
 We do not observe advertisements networks aired for their upcoming programs (“tune-
ins” or “promos”), as TNS’ ad-recording software was not able to distinguish tune-ins from 
network programs. Time given to tune-ins is a potentially important omitted variable. A 2001 
report found that networks aired 4:07 minutes of tune-ins per hour. This compared with 9:44 
minutes of advertising, and tune-ins and traditional advertising time had a correlation of -0.31 
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(AAAA/ANA 2001). In section TA.3, we discuss potential endogeneity issues arising from not 
observing tune-ins and how we control for these in estimation.  
 We observe an audience rating for each demographic group whose top-100 list included 
that program. We do not observe a program’s audience rating if it falls short of the 100th-highest 
audience rating in the week it aired. Therefore our measure of the outside good incorporates 
programs that are not listed in the top-100.   We were concerned that when we have a program 
that appears on the top-100 list in some weeks and sometimes does not appear, then the error 
term might not be orthogonal to the observed data. We calculated the prevalence of this issue in 
the dataset. We found that 98.7% of the network-half-hour observations in the audience data 
belong to programs that always appear on the top-100 list.  Thus this doesn’ not appear to be an 
issue. 
 
  
 We use two sets of instruments to address potential remaining endogeneity issues: lags of  
advertising time, and lags of product placement time. Traditional advertising time and product 
placement seconds are autocorrelated (1-week correlations of 0.42 and 0.44, respectively), so 
lags are good proxies for current advertising time and product placements. Their exclusion from 
the viewer utility function is justified if networks are myopic when setting traditional advertising 
time and product placements.21  
 We follow standard procedures to test the usefulness of lags of ad seconds and product 
placement seconds as instruments for current ad seconds and product placement time (see, e.g., 
Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2003). We follow three steps. The first is to use F-tests to 
determine whether the proposed instruments jointly explain the endogenous variables in the first 
stage. The second step is to use F-tests to determine whether the system of instrumental variables 
is overidentified. This test requires that at least two of the instruments are valid (e.g., the fifth 
lags of advertising and product placement), and is sometimes not employed because it can have 
low power, suggesting that using it may lead us to fail to reject a false hypothesis (Small 2007). 
However we note that the absence of an overidentification test has no power, ensuring that we 
will fail to reject a false hypothesis; thus, we present the overidentification test in conjunction 
with the theoretical arguments above. The third step is to use a Hausman specification test to 
gauge the difference between the OLS and IV estimates. The third step checks whether IV 
estimation changes the point estimates of the endogenous regressors. If it does not change the 
estimates, we retain MNL non IV estimates on efficiency grounds. 
 Table TA1 displays the results of the first two steps. The first column of the table 
presents results from the first-stage regression of advertising seconds on the proposed 
instruments and the exogenous variables in the viewer utility function. Lags of advertising 
                                                 
21 Our approach is similar to much of the marketing literature (e.g., Villa-Boas and Winer 1999) which uses lagged 
values of strategic variables to proxy for contemporaneous values. 
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seconds are significant and the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the candidate instruments 
jointly do not explain the dependent variable at a high confidence level. The second column of 
the table indicates that the instruments jointly explain product placement seconds to a similar 
degree. The third column tests the joint significance of the instruments in the second-stage 
equation. The F-statistic fails to reject the null that the instruments do not jointly explain the log-
transformed program ratings. Thus we conclude that lags of advertising and product placement 
time are valid instruments for current advertising and product placement time, conditional on the 
theoretical restrictions related to the overidentification test noted above. 
 Finally, we compare the parameter estimates under OLS and IV. If there is no significant 
difference, OLS results are preferred on efficiency grounds. The Hausman test fails to reject the 
null that the OLS estimates are different from the IV estimates. Thus the use of these instruments 
does not change the estimated effects of the potentially endogenous variables enough to justify 
the loss of efficiency associated with IV estimation.  
 
Instrument
First-stage Est. 
in AdSec Eqn.
First-stage Est. 
in PP Eqn.
Second-Stage 
Est. in Viewer 
Demand Eqn.
(T-Stat) (T-Stat) (T-Stat)
Ad Seconds
   1st Lag 0.16 (17.38) -0.03 (-1.53) 4.5E-5 (1.39)
   2nd Lag 0.13 (13.64) 0.01 (0.34) 4.4E-6 (0.14)
   3rd Lag 0.09 (9.89) -0.02 (-0.99) 8.0E-6 (0.25)
   4th Lag 0.09 (9.33) 0.00 (0.2) -1.7E-5 (-0.54)
   5th Lag 0.09 (10.47) 0.01 (0.62) -3.3E-5 (-1.07)
Product Placement Seconds
   1st Lag 2.0E-3 (0.6) 0.06 (7.18) -2.9E-5 (-2.51)
   2nd Lag 4.2E-3 (1.29) 0.03 (3.5) -2.5E-6 (-0.22)
   3rd Lag -5.7E-3 (-1.57) 0.03 (3.28) 1.7E-5 (1.4)
   4th Lag -2.5E-3 (-0.7) 0.03 (3.81) -8.5E-6 (-0.68)
   5th Lag 4.1E-4 (0.11) 0.04 (4.53) 1.8E-6 (0.14)
Null Hypothesis No joint effect No joint effect No joint effect
R2 in unrestricted model 0.4383 0.6307 0.8315
R2 in restricted model 0.3316 0.6231 0.8313
Joint Significance F-Stat 173.26 18.73 1.08
99% Critical Value 2.32 2.32 2.32
P-Value 0 1.71E-34 0.37
Result Reject Null Reject Null Don't Reject Null  
 
Table TA1. Instrumental Variables Tests 
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TA.3 Identification  
We discuss informally what variation in the data identifies the parameters. Associated with each 
network-half hour is a mean utility, nt , which is chosen to match observed and predicted 
audience ratings. Audience levels identify the show, network-day, week, and half-hour effects. 
Holding these characteristics constant, correlations between audience, advertising, and product 
placement over time identify the mean utility parameters associated with advertising and product 
placement. 
 In practice we cannot estimate a separate dummy for every show in the sample. Thus we 
assign a show dummy to as many shows as possible, where the remaining shows are described 
by NewEps, network-day, season-week, half-hour, and genre effects. Some genre effects are 
dropped because they are highly collinear with the set of show dummies for the shows belonging 
to that genre. We are able to separately identify show effects from network-time effects because 
of the rich scheduling variation over the three-year sample period.   The taste parameters,   and 
α,  associated with non-time changing ntX  are identified using a minimum distance procedure 
outlined in the next section. The idenfication strategy follows Nevo (2000) who shows that the 
two-step estimate technique we employ, together with the assumption that the nt are mean 
independent of other program characteristics, allows for identification of the mean random 
coefficient. 22 
Identification of the taste distribution parameters,  , relies on patterns of viewer 
substitution between shows. While the means are identified by audience sizes, the standard 
deviations are identified by the “stickiness” of how those audience sizes change when faced with 
variation in show competition, advertising, and product placements on competing networks 
within the same half-hour.  
 
TA.4. Estimation 
The first step is to match the model’s predicted ratings to observed ratings. We seek the vector 
),(  obstS  that implicitly solves 
                                                       0),(  tobst sS ,                                                            (TA2)  
where obstS  and ts  are tN -vectors of observed and predicted audience ratings respectively and 
  represents the complete parameter set. For each guess of  , we start with an initial set of 
mean utilities 0nt , calculate ),( 00  ntnts , construct a new guess )(),( 0
01
ntnt
obs
nt
ntnt s
SS   , and repeat 
these last two steps r times until ),(),( 1  obstrntobstrnt SS   is arbitrarily close to zero ( 1410  in 
our application). We then calculate the structural error term substituting ),(  obstrnt S  for nt . The 
error term is given by 
                                                 
22 As Nevo (2000) shows, this procedure is equivalent to a GLS regression where the independent variable consists 
of the estimated program effects. The number of  “observations” in this regression is the number of programs. Please 
see Nevo (2000) for more detail. 
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                                  ));,((),()( jntintnt
obs
t
r
ntnt XpqvS   .                           (TA3) 
We search over   to minimize the GMM objective function 
                                                         )'()''( 1    ZZ ,                                                        (TA4) 
where }{ nt   is the Nx1 error term, and   is a weighting matrix. As an initial guess we 
set ZZ '  to get a consistent estimate of )'')('(ˆ   ZZ , which we use in the final 
parameter estimation.  
 The BLP estimation routine has the desirable property that it is linear in preference 
means, which greatly speeds computation by reducing the number of parameters that enter the 
objective function nonlinearly. However it is still nonlinear in the standard deviations of the 
preference distributions, and computation time increases exponentially with the number of 
nonlinear parameters to be estimated. We restrict the number of parameters interacting with 
unobserved viewer heterogeneity to two: those multiplied by the terms ntp  and ntq  (i.e. K=2). To 
simulate individual television viewers, we invert the Normal distribution at 500 multivariate 
Halton draws for each random utility parameter, and use antithetic acceleration to produce 500 
more draws to reduce simulation variance.23 Thus our total number of simulated viewers is 
1,000.  The data we use in estimation is the final seven weeks of the 2004-05 season, since 
product placement data were not available until March 28, 2005; and weeks 6-35 of the 2005-06 
and 2006-07 seasons, since we have weekly five lags of audience and ad price per viewer in our 
utility specification.24 
 The primary reason to estimate the random coefficients logit model is that its estimated 
elasticities do not exhibit the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives problem. The 
advertising elasticities generated by this model are  
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The elasticities in equation TA5 contain ints , the probability that simulated individual i picks 
alternative n at time t, given a change in ad time mtq . Therefore substitution patterns are not 
                                                 
23For more on antithetic acceleration see Stern (1997, 2000). Geweke (1988) shows if antithetic acceleration is 
implemented during simulation, then the loss in precision is of order 1/N (where N is the number of observations), 
which requires no adjustment to the asymptotic covariance matrix.  
24 We used logit results for starting values for parameter means, and evaluated the objective function at 1000 points 
in a grid search to find starting values for the random coefficients. We found many local minima, but when drawn 
over the range of grid points we sampled, the objective function looks convex to the eye in both dimensions of  . 
Computation time was about five days on a 3.2 GHz computer using serial processing. 
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driven by aggregate market shares irrespective of program characteristics, as in the multinomial 
logit model, but instead they are calculated as the aggregation of simulated discrete choices. Also 
notable is that the model produces a different elasticity for each network-half hour.  
TA.5. Serial Correlation 
As noted in section 2, we have included five weekly lags of the network’s weekday-timeslot 
rating to control for audience state dependence. If   is serially correlated, including these 
lagged audience shares will pick up the effects of previous values of the error term. Serial 
correlation therefore will not bias the effects of advertising and product placement, since this 
correlation exists between observed variables. Therefore it is possible that the effects of the state 
dependence terms are biased.  
TA.6. Interpreting Estimation Results 
Implicit in our interpretation of our advertising and product placement results is the assumption 
that product category advertisements do not correlate with unobserved audience propensity to 
switch channels in response to advertising. For example, if Light Beer ads always appear during 
very popular sports events, and viewers of very popular sports events never change channels 
during commercials, we could find spurious positive effects of Light Beer ads on audiences. We 
think this possibility is interesting but unlikely. We see in the data substantial variation in the 
programs and genres in which category ads appear. For example, Light Beer ads appear in many, 
many different programs and genres, and those brands would have to continually appear in the 
episodes of programs during which viewers were least likely to switch. Individual level viewing 
data would likely be most effective in examining this hypothesis. 
 
TA.7. Additional Product Placement Results 
Table TA2 presents parameter estimates measuring the impact of product placement 
characteristics on viewer utility. We include in ntX  the product placement characteristics 
described in section 3.3. ntX  includes tlnx , the fraction of product placement seconds on network 
n during half-hour t that have characteristic l. In this way we are able to separately control for the 
amount of placements during the program and the types of placements observed. The estimates 
are small in magnitude or not statistically significant suggesting that product placement 
characteristics are not driving program viewing decisions.  Table TA3 displays the estimates for 
product placement category effects.  
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Variable
Point Est. 
(T-Stat) Variable
Point Est. 
(T-Stat)
Verbal Only .06 (0.9) Integration as a Prize or Reward .00 (0.1)
Direct Visual Only -.02 (0.7) Integrated Directly into Game/Contest .04 (1.0)
Implied Visual Only -.03 (1.1) Integrated Partially Into Game/Contest -.09 (1.5)
Verbal & Direct Visual -.04 (1.0) Integration as a Sponsorship .02 (0.8)
Verbal & Implied Visual -- Other Integration .04 (1.8)
Product or Package shown .04 (0.8) No Integration --
Brand Name shown .02 (0.4) Fully Visible -.01 (0.5)
Brand Mark shown .05 (1.1) Partially Visible -.02 (0.6)
Billboard or Graphic Overlay .05 (0.8) Not Applicable --
No Visual -- No Clutter .00 (0.0)
Interaction Interaction w/ Real Life Persona -.08 (1.3) Clutter --
Interaction w/ Fictional Character -.04 (0.7) Brand Interaction .06 (0.9)
No Interaction -- Product Interaction (Proper Use) .04 (0.6)
Foreground .01 (0.6) Product Interaction (Improper Use) .08 (1.1)
Background -- No Interaction --
Visual 
Location
Visual 
Interaction 
Type
Clutter
Visibility
Appearance
Type Integration
 
 
Table TA2. Product Placement Characteristics Estimates 
 
Category
Point Est. 
(T-Stat)
% All PP 
Seconds Category
Point Est. 
(T-Stat)
% All PP 
Seconds
Gelatins and Puddings 0.0014 (2.0) 0.10% Apparel -0.0003 (-2.7) 1.64%
Regular Beer & Ale 0.0007 (2.0) 0.42% Pre-Recorded Video -0.0003 (-4.6) 1.09%
Cosmetics & Beauty Aids 0.0006 (2.1) 0.46% Corporate Advertising -0.0004 (-2.4) 0.53%
Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks 0.0003 (4.7) 10.37% Magazines -0.0005 (-2.0) 0.91%
Sneakers 0.0002 (3.0) 3.14% Cars, Domestic -0.0007 (-2.0) 0.48%
Motion Pictures 0.0002 (2.7) 1.53% Wireless Telecom Providers -0.0007 (-4.2) 1.77%
Internet Service Providers -0.0008 (-4.7) 0.89%
Credit Cards -0.0012 (-2.4) 0.29%
Prepared Dinners & Entrees -0.0022 (-2.7) 0.09%
Employment Agencies -0.0054 (-3.3) 0.12%
Medical Supplies -0.0070 (-2.3) 0.04%
Positive Category Product Placement Effectsa
a Only effects significant at the 95% confidence level are shown.
Negative Category Product Placement Effectsa
 
Table TA3. Category Product Placement Utility 
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